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Rethinking Tison v. Arizona
I.

INTRODUCTION

In drafting the cruel and unusual punishment clause
amendment,' the framers of the federal constitution
tended to prohibit punishment through "torture or any
rous method." ' 2 The contemporary reading of the cruel

of the eighth
arguably inother barbaand unusual

3
punishment clause is that neither the federal nor state governments
1. The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONsT. amend VIII.
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-70 (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1975). For example, during a
state convention called to ratify the federal constitution, Patrick Henry fervently
argued for a constitutional provision prohibiting "cruel and unusual punishments":
What has distinguished our ancestors?-That they would not admit of
tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce
the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They
may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany-of torturing,
to extort a confession of the crime.
3 J. ELUOT, DEBATES 447-48 (1863), quoted in Gregg, at 170 n. 17. A similar argument
was heard at the Massachusetts convention: "They are nowhere restrained from
inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments and annexing them to crimes;
and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be
amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline." 2 ELLIOT, at 111 (emphasis
in original), quoted in Gregg, at 170 n.17.
However, some writers proffer that ascertaining the original intent of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause is difficult at best. Bedau, Thinking of the Death
Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 873, 892 (1985)
(claims that since no document exists which states the framers' intentions in adding
the clause to the eighth amendment, no statement by the framers exists explaining
what the framers understood the clause to mean, no list by the framers exists
specifying the properties of a cruel and unusual punishment and no exhaustive list
of cruel and unusual punishments were left behind by the framers, any claimed
knowledge we have of the framers' intent is only indirect evidence - which is arguably
inconclusive).
3. The eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause now applies
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 n.8 (1976) (plurality opinion
of Stewart, Powell and Stevens JJ.); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw - Eighth Amendment - The Death Penalty and the Felony-Murder Rule, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
179, 179 n.2 (1984). However, an argument may be made that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause was implicitly incorporated into the fourteenth amendment earlier
in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (plurality opinion) in
which the Court opined: "The Fourteenth [amendment] would prohibit by its due
process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner." Id. at 463 (footnote omitted).
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can impose inhuman and barbarous punishments, nor can there be a
lack of proportion between the punishment and the severity of the
4
crime.
The reading of the eighth amendment involved in the case Tison
v. Arizona5 is significant in that it addresses the proportionality of
imposing the death penalty upon one convicted of first degree murder,
absent the finding of a specific intent to kill.6 The issue raised by
Tison v. Arizona is whether the eighth amendment prohibits the death
penalty for a felony-murderer when the defendant's participation is
major and when his mental state is one of reckless indifference to the
value of human life.7 In a five to four decision,8 the Court held that
capital punishment is not prohibited by the eighth amendment under
these circumstances. 9 To properly analyze the reasoning of the Court
in Tison, it is essential to review the context under which it arose.
Thus, before the reasoning of the decision is analyzed, pertinent case
law and the prior history of Tison shall be reviewed.

II.

PRIOR DECISIONS UNDER THE CRUEL AND

UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE

When the eighth amendment was adopted in the late eighteenth
century, the common law in every state imposed a mandatory death
penalty for "all homicides that were not involuntary, provoked,
justified or excused."' 1 However, the evolving standards of society
later indicated a repudiation of automatic death sentences." By 1963

at 171.

4. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 381 (1910); Gregg, 428 U.S.
5. 107 S. Ct. 1676, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201 (1987).
6. Id. at 1685.
7. Id.

8. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C.J., and White, Powell, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting

opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, and in Parts I, II, III, and IV-A of which
Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined.
9. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
10. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976); See also H. BEDAU,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5-6, 15, 23-24, 27-28, (rev. ed. 1967) [hereinafter
BEDAU].

11. The contemporary standards of society are reflected in legislative enactments. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1975) ("The
most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is
the legislative response to Furman . . ."); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 ("The two

crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting the imposition of
punishment in our society [are] jury determinations and legislative enactments ...");
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every state, rather than maintaining their automatic death sentence
schemes, had either adopted discretionary death penalty schemes for
the crime of first degree murder or had abolished capital punishment
altogether. 12 Hence, there was yet a disagreement between the states
as to the death penalty as a punishment for the crime of first degree
murder. Seemingly to resolve the inconsistency between and act as a
future guide for the states, the United States Supreme Court subsequently decided many cases concerning capital punishment for the
crime of first degree murder.
3 markedly changed the
The decision in Furman v. Georgia"
constitutional status of discretionary sentencing in cases involving the
death penalty as a punishment for capital murder. Furman involved
the consolidation of three cases. In two of the cases, the petitioners
were sentenced to death for rape and in the third case the petitioner
was sentenced to death for murder. 14 Of the separate opinions filed
in support of the judgment in Furman, Justices Stewart, White and
Douglas held discretionary sentencing which is unguided by legislatively defined standards violates the eighth amendment. In striking
down the sentencing statutes of Georgia and Texas, the plurality of
three in separately filed opinions emphasized defects in the sentencing
process itself, rather than capital punishment in general, as violative
of the eighth amendment. 5
In his Furman opinion, Justice Douglas stated that the idea of
equal protection of the laws is implicit in the cruel and unusual
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 436-37 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("In a
democracy the first indicator of the public's attitude must always be found in the
legislative judgments of the people's chosen representatives"). Contemporary standards are also indicated by jury determinations. As the Court noted in Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) "[Tlhe jury . . . is a significant and reliable objective
index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved." Id. at 795 (quoting
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181); See also Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1 (1966).
12. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291-92. The Court stated: "[Bly the end of World
War I, all but eight states, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia either had adopted
discretionary death penalty schemes or abolished the death penalty altogether. By
1963, all of these remaining jurisdictions had replaced their automatic death penalty
statutes with discretionary jury sentencing." Id.
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14. Id. at 239. Two of Furman's three petitioners were sentenced to death in
Georgia while the other was sentenced to death in Texas. One Georgia petitioner was
sentenced under § 26-1302 of the Georgia Code Annotated, effective prior to July 1,
1969. The other Georgia petitioner was sentenced under § 26-2001 of the Georgia
Criminal Code, effective July 1, 1969. The Texas petitioner was sentenced under
Article 1189 of the Texas Penal Code. Id. at 308 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring).
15. See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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punishment clause. 16 Justice Douglas continued by stating that administration of the death sentencing statutes was highly discriminatory in
effect and was thereby violative of the evenhandedness implicit in the
cruel and unusual punishment clause. 7
In finding the statutes involved in Furman to be unconstitutional,
Justice Stewart noted many murderers and rapists whose crimes were
perpetrated in a manner just as reprehensible as those perpetrated by
the petitioners in Furman did not receive the death penalty.'" Based
on the above fact, Justice Stewart concluded the unique penalty of
death 19 was "wantonly" and "freakishly" imposed and, therefore,
the sentencing procedures, as then administered, were violative of the
eighth amendment.20
Justice White also pointed to inconsistencies in the administration
of sentencing statutes in showing the unconstitutionality of the statutes
involved in Furman.21 Moreover, Justice White went a step further
and pointed to the great infrequency with which the death penalty is
exacted. 22 Based on these observations, Justice White found that
capital punishment as then administered imposed death with "only
marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes, ' 23
16. Furman, at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17. Id. "[Tihese discretionary statutes are ... pregnant with discrimination
and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection
of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id. 408
U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment,
not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique
in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal
justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is
embodied in our concept of humanity.

Id.

20. Id. at 310.
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of
rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, . . . the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has
in fact been imposed.
Id. at 309-10.
21. "[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most
atrocious crimes and ... there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).

22. Id.

23. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
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thus violating the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth

Amendment .24

The Court's multi-opinioned decision in Furman is susceptible to
diverse interpretations. 25 As a reaction to Furman some states adopted
mandatory death sentencing measures while others enacted statutes
containing standards to guide jury discretion. 26 Thus, an inconsistency
still existed between the states as to the application of death penalty
schemes to those found guilty of first degree murder. However,
subsequent decisions continued to clarify the law in the death sen27
tencing area.
Four years after Furman, the Supreme Court considered five
cases (hereinafter, the Gregg cases) concerning the constitutional
validity of several post-Furman death penalty statutes. 2 Four Justices
held all of the statutes to be constitutional, 29 whereas, two Justices
found them to be unconstitutional. 0 Therefore, the outcome of the
Gregg cases depended upon the remaining three Justices, who delivered a joint opinion in each of the five cases.' The plurality made
several conclusions concerning the process of death sentencing, three
of which are set out below.

24. Id. "I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes before us are now
administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is
too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice." Id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring).
25. "Predictably, the variety of opinions supporting the judgment in Furman
engendered confusion as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty
in accord with the Eighth Amendment." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978)
(footnotes omitted).
26. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298-99 (1976). The Court stated:
"[Slome states have adopted mandatory measures following Furman while others
have legislated standards to guide the jury. [This] discrepancy appears attributable to
diverse readings of this Court's multi-opinioned decision in that case." Id. (footnote
omitted).
27. See infra notes 28-74 and accompanying text.
28. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) (upholding Georgia's death penalty statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
(upholding Florida's death penalty statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(upholding Texas' death penalty statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976), (holding North Carolina's death penalty statute violated the eighth and
fourteenth amendments); and Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisana, 428 U.S. 325, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (holding Louisiana's death penalty statute violated the
eighth and fourteenth amendments).
29. Burger, C.J., White, Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J.
30. Brennan and Marshall, JJ.
31. Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.
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First, the joint opinion in the Gregg cases concluded that Furman

required sentencing discretion to be not fully eliminated but "directed
and limited ' 3 2 through provision of objective standards.33 The plurality offered three reasons for providing objective standards within the

state sentencing statutes: to guide the fact finder in its decisionmaking; to induce consistent decisions from case to case; and to
provide for a process of imposing the death penalty which is rationally
34
reviewable.

Second, the joint opinion in the Gregg cases concluded that a
capital sentencing procedure must permit consideration by the sentencer of the "character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense . .

,,.5 Such individual-

32. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
33. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
34. Id. at 304. "Furman's basic requirement (is the replacement of] arbitrary
and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." Id. However,
the Supreme Court has since held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments do
not require a reviewing court to look at the senctences received by comparable
criminals in making its sentencing determination. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,
43-44 (1984).
35. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. The Court stated:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense . . . treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as
uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.
Id.
The factors a sentencer was allowed to look at to determine an appropriate
punishment was further expanded upon in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
The Court noted that capital cases, more than other types of cases, called for
individualized sentencing and stated the reasons therefor:
The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of
respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in
noncapital cases. A variety of flexible techniques-probation, parole, work
furloughs, to name a few-and various postconviction remedies may be
available to modify an initial sentence of confinement in noncapital cases.
Id. at 605. The Court went on to invalidate an Ohio death sentencing statute which
limited the mitigating circumstances a court could consider in deciding on a sentence
because the United States Constitution required consideration of all relevant mitigating circumstances during a sentencing involving the possibility of death. Id. at 608.
See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (sentencer cannot be
precluded from considering petitioner's family history); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S.
95, 97 (1979) (sentencer cannot be precluded from considering hearisay evidence); Bell
v. Ohio 438 U.S. 637, 642 (1978) (sentencer cannot be precluded from considering
lack of intent or actual presence). The Court in Lockett noted: "[tihe limited range

TISON v. ARIZONA

1988:1551

ized sentencing determinations were deemed to be essential because

the death penalty's unique characteristic as an irrevocable punishment,
when viewed in light of the "fundamental

respect for humanity

underlying the Eighth Amendment,"36 called for an acute need for
reliability in the sentencing decision.

Third, the Gregg plurality concluded that the death penalty
7
cannot be imposed when to do so would be excessive.1 In determining
whether the death penalty is excessive, two questions'must be answered: (1) whether the punishment involves "the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain" and (2) whether the punishment is grossly
38
disproportionate to the offense charged. If either question is an39
swered in the affirmative, the death penalty cannot be imposed. As

to the first question, a punishment involves the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain when imposition of the death penalty

4°
furthers neither goals of deterrence nor retribution for the class of
41 Concerning the second
offenders to which the defendant belongs.
question noted above, determining whether the punishment is grossly

of mitigating circumstances which may be considered by the sentencer under the Ohio
statute is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. To meet
constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration
of relevant mitigating factors." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
36. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. "[Tlhe penalty of death is qualitatively different
from a sentence of imprisonment, however long ....

Because of that qualitative

difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Id. at
305.
37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1975).
38. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (applying Gregg, 428 U.S. at
173); Radin, "Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A
Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1113, 1146 (1985)
("[T]he Supreme Court .

.

. review[s] capital punishment both in terms of cultural

acceptance and in terms of an objective theory of just punishment"); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-The Death Penalty and the Felony-Murder
Rule, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 179, 190-91 (1984) [hereinafter Death Penalty];
Comment, The Felony Murder Rule and the Death Penalty: Enmund v. FloridaOverreaching by the Supreme Court?, 19 NEw ENG. L. REV. 255, 268 (1983)
[hereinafter "Felony Murder Rule"].
39. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
40. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 ([Tlhe sanction imposed cannot be so totally without
penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering); Felony
Murder Rule, supra note 38, at 268.
41. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; Felony Murder Rule, supra note 38, at 269 ("[lIt

is not necessary that the goals [of retribution and deterrence] be advanced in every
instance where an offense is committed, as long as they are advanced for some classes
of offenders").
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disproportionate to the offense charged invokes proportionality analysis.42 Such analysis involves determining whether the proposed
pun-

ishment is grossly disproportionate to the offense charged. 41 In making
its proportionality determination, the plurality looked to legislative
decisions, 4 jury decisions, 45 and the historical application of the

punishment to the particular offense. 46 These three criteria are indicative of the appropriate punishment to be imposed in that they shed
light on contemporary societal values 4 7-an important consideration

in any proportionality analysis. 48

Proportionality analysis was again applied in Coker v. Georgia49
in which the Court held the death penalty could not be imposed upon
a person convicted of rape when no life had been taken. 0 In what

has been described as "a turning point in eighth amendment jurispru-

dence"," the Court, for the first time, relied solely upon proportionality analysis to invalidate a death sentencing statute. 2 The Court
looked to legislative enactments, 3 jury determinations: 4 and the
42. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1975);

See also Felony Murder Rule, supra note 38, at 269-70.
43. Felony Murder Rule, supra note 38, at 269-70.
44. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175; Felony Murder Rule, supra note 38, at 269.

45. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181; Felony

Murder Rule, supra note 38, at 270.
46. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176; Felony Murder Rule,

supra note 38, at 270.

47. "[Iln a democratic society legislatures

...

are constituted to respond to

the will and consequently the moral values of the people." Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 175, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1975) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 383); "[t]he jury also is a significant and reliable objective index of

contemporary values. . . ." Gregg, at 181.
48. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 ("[t]he [eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) . . . . Thus, an assessment of
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to
the application of the Eighth Amendment").
49. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
50. Id. at 598-99; Death Penalty, supra note 38, at 192-93.
51. Radin, The Jurisprudenceof Death: Evolving Standardsfor the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 990 (1978) [hereinafter RADIN].
52. Death Penalty, supra note 38, at 192 n.80.
53. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594-6 (1977). The Court's analysis of the
state statutes involved several observations. No state which prohibited the death
penalty for rape before Furman included rape as a capital felony in its post-Furman
death penalty statutes. Id. at 594. Furthermore, out of the sixteen states that had
allowed the death penalty for rape of an adult woman before Furman, only three
(Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina) allowed the same in their post-Furman

1988:1551

TISON v. ARIZONA

55
crime's harm in relation to the punishment of death in reaching its
decision.5 6 The Court avoided the interjection of its own subjective
views by looking at the "objective" criteria in the Court's proportionality analysis."
The same objective criteria relied upon by the Court during its
proportionality analysis in Coker were applied again in what is
arguably the leading case on proportionality analysis-Enmund v.
Florida.8 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a first degree murder
conviction even though there was a finding that the defendant was

statutes. Id. The Louisiana and North Carolina death penalty statutes which provided
for mandatory death sentences for the crime of rape were held invalid in Roberts
and Woodson. Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36,- reh'g denied,
429 U.S. 890 (1976). The Court thereby found the death penalty disproportionate in
that only one state (Georgia) imposed it for rape of an adult woman. Coker, 433
U.S. at 596-97 ("[the death penalty statutes as applied to this case weigh] heavily on
the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty. . .

.")

(footnote

omitted).
54. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97. The Court reviewed sixty-three post-Furman
rape convictions and concluded that since only five of the sixty-three convicts were
sentenced to death, juries rejected capital punishment for the crime of rape in the
vast majority of cases. Id. at 597.
55. Id. at 597-600. After observing a Georgia statute allowing the imposition
of the death penalty for homicide only upon a finding of sufficient aggravating
circumstances, the Court stated "[i]t is difficult to accept the notion . . . that the
rapist, with or without aggravating circumstances, should be punished more heavily
than the deliberate killer as long as the rapist does not himself take the life of his
victim." Id. at 600. The Court concluded that the proportionality between the harm
done and the punishment is the factor which distinguishes Coker from Gregg. Death
Penalty supra note 38, at 192-93. The Court stated:
The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over
for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly
so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.
We have an abiding conviction that the death penalty, which is "unique in
its severity and irrevocability" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187, is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
56. Death Penalty, supra note 38, at 192-93.
57. Felony Murder Rule, supra note 38, at 268 ("In applying the test, a court
must rely ['] to the maximum possible extent['] on the objective indicia ....

Thus,

the interjection of a court's own subjective views is avoided.") (quoting Coker, 433
U.S. at 592).
Some feel Coker was decided wrongly in that the Court substituted its own
judgment for that of the legislature. For a critical analysis of Coker, see Note, Coker
v. Georgia:DisproportionatePunishment and the Death Penalty for Rape, 78 COLUM.

L. REv. 1714 (1978).
58. 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (where plaintiff was the driver of the "getaway" car
but was not present at the scene of an armed robbery in which a murder took place).
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not present at the scene of a robbery in which his co-felons murdered
the victims. 59 In a plurality opinion, 6o the Court, pursuant to a
proportionality analysis, held that the death penalty was disproportionate as applied to one who was not present during the commission
of the murder and did not kill, attempt to kill, intend that a killing
occur nor intend that lethal force be used. 61
In reaching its decision, the Court in Enmund applied the analyses
utilized in the Gregg cases involving the two purposes of punishmentdeterrence and retribution.62 The Court held deterrence was not served
by imposing death upon Enmund because the death penalty could
deter would-be-criminals "only when a murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation."63 The Court also found the furtherance
of retribution to be absent in Enmund's case.6 It can be inferred in
the Court's opinion that Enmund's moral guilt was limited to the
robbery and, therefore, sentencing Enmund to death would "not
measurably contribute to the retributive end of insuring that the

criminal gets his just deserts [sic].

"65

Since neither deterrence nor

retribution were found to be served by sentencing Enmund to death,

59. Enmund v. Florida, 399 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1981) (affirming Earl Enmund's
convictions and sentencing). The Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
finding that Enmund was present at the murder scene because there was sufficient
evidence to support an inference that Enmund was merely in a parked car during the
commission of the crime. Id. at 1370.
60. White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., were the plurality
(Enmund, 458 U.S. at 783); Brennan, J., concurred (Id. at 801); and O'Connor, J.,
dissented, joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.(Id. at 801).
61. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. The Court stated:
[I]t is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits
imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets
a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who
does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force will be employed.
Id.

62. Id. at 798-801.
63. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982) (quoting Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The plurality continued
by stating that since such a small percentage of robberies involve a death, the
possibility of the death penalty's imposition would not "enter into the cold calculus
that precedes the decision to act." Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 (quoting Gregg, 428
U.S. at 186); See also, Death Penalty, supra note 38, at 198-99.

64. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800-01; See, Imposing the Death Sentence for Felony

Murder on a Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L. REv. 857, 863 (1985) [hereinafter Non-

Triggerman].
65. Death Penalty, supra note 38, at 199 ("Enmund's moral guilt was limited

to robbery in the court's analysis. . .

.").

Id.
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the Court felt the death penalty would be an excessive punishment in
Enmund's case. 66
The Court in Enmund also based its finding of excessiveness
upon its Coker proportionality analysis which involved a survey of
67
state death sentencing statutes and jury determinations. The Court
found approximately one third of all of the American jurisdictions
would ever sentence to death a defendant involved in a felony-murder
who did not take life, attempt to take life nor intend that a life be
taken. 6s While this statistic was not as compelling as that involved in
Coker, it still indicated a legislative rejection of the imposition of the
69
death penalty upon nontriggerman felony-murderers. A similar finding was made when jury determinations were studied. The Court
noted that out of the 362 executions reported since 1954, only six
involved a nontriggerman in a felony-murder-all of whom happened
to be executed in 1955, more than one quarter of a century before
Enmund was decided. 70 The Court also noted only three of the 739
inmates on death row when Enmund was decided were sentenced to
death "absent a finding that they ... participated in a scheme
designed to kill the victim."'" The Court further noted that Enmund
was the only person out of forty-five felony-murderers on death row
in Florida at the time the case was decided who was not the triggerman
72
and was not found to have had an intent to kill. These statistics
were held to show that juries considered death a disproportionate
73
punishment for someone in Enmund's position. The statistics on
legislative enactments and jury decisions were then found to indicate

66. Id.

67. See Felony Murder Rule, supra note 38, at 273; see also Death Penalty,

supra note 38, at 192-98.
68. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 782, 792 (1982).

69. Death Penalty, supra note 38, at 192-199; see also, Felony Murder Rule,

supra note 38, at 273. The Court in Enmund stated:
While the current legislative judgment with respect to imposition of the
death penalty where a defendant did not take life, attempt to take it, or
intend to take life is neither "wholly unanimous among state legislatures,"
nor as compelling as the legislative judgments considered in Coker, it
nevertheless weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime
at issue.
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792-93 (citation omitted).
70. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794-95.
71. Id. at 795.

72. Id.
73. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982); Non-Triggerman supra note
64, at 863.
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that contemporary values rejected "the death penalty for accomplice
,,74
liability in felony murders. ....

To sum up the capital punishment cases decided before Tison,
the states were guided as to how to implement death sentencing
schemes in accordance with the Eighth Amendment. Furman pointed

out defects in the administration of the death sentencing process while
the Gregg cases performed proportionality analysis to see whether

imposition of the death penalty in a particular case coincided with

contemporary societal values. The Court in Coker further guided the
states as to the conduction of death penalty analysis in the future by
requiring courts to look at objective criteria during their proportion-

ality analyses. Enmund showed that nationwide statistics are a crucial
aspect of the objective criteria looked at during the conduction of
proportionality analysis. This casenote now turns to analyzing what
Tison contributes to guiding the states in implementing death sentencing schemes.

III.
A.

TisoN v.ARIZONA

FACTS OF THE CASE

Gary Tison had been in prison a number of years for murdering

a prison guard during an escape." Gary Tison's wife, their three sons
Donald, Ricky, and Raymond, and Gary's brother Joseph, planned
to free Gary Tison from prison via another escape.7 6 Gary Tison
insisted that his cellmate, Randy Greenawalt, who was also serving a

life sentence for murder," be included in the escape."8 The Tison
family acquired several weapons for use in the escape.7 9 Raymond
Tison testified that it was agreed nobody would get hurt throughout

74. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 793-94; see also supra note 38, at 197-98.
75. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1678, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201
(1987).
76. Id. However, there is evidence to the contrary showing that Gary Tison
had planned the escape for over one year, only divulged his plan for the first time
to a family member (Raymond) one week prior to the escape, and first requested his
family's help in the escape attempt the day before the escape. Id. at 1693 n.7.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1678.
78. Tison, 107 S.Ct. at 1678.
79. Id. For example, a gunsmith testified that Ricky Tison requested him to
saw off shotguns and that Ricky, with the help of his mother, bought a .45 caliber
Colt handgun from him. State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 129 Ariz. at 531, 633 P.2d
at 340 (1981).
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the escape attempt.8 0 On July 30, 1978, the three Tison brothers
carried a cooler filled with guns into the prison, armed their father
and Greenawalt, herded visitors and prison guards into a closet, and
left prison grounds in a Ford Galaxy automobile."'
The men acquired a different car, a white Lincoln, at an isolated
house.82 After a few days, they left the house and drove the Lincoln
3
on backroads through the desert until a tire blew out. Raymond
Tison flagged down a car while the other four were armed and
hidden.8 4 A Mazda containing John and Donnelda Lyons, their twoyear-old son Christopher and 15-year-old niece, Theresa Tyson, pulled
85
to the side of the road to render assistance. The Lyons' were ushered
at gunpoint into the Lincoln automobile's backseat which Donald and
Raymond Tison then drove further into the desert while Gary Tison,
6
Randy Greenawalt and Ricky Tison followed in the Mazda. They
parked the cars trunk to trunk. The Tisons transferred the Lyons'
belongings into the Lincoln and the Tison group's belongings into the
7
Mazda, confiscating the Lyons' guns and money in the process.
Raymond Tison then drove the Lincoln further into the desert
where Gary disabled it by shooting the radiator. The Lyons and
Theresa Tyson were ordered to stand in front of the Lincoln's
headlights. John Lyons asked the men not to kill him and suggested
give the Lyons family some water and
that the Tisons and Greenawalt
88
desert.
the
in
leave them
At their father's request, Raymond and Ricky went to the Mazda
90
to retrieve water8 9 for the victims. Raymond Tison testified that after
the water jug was found, he and Ricky were repacking the Mazda
when Gary Tison and Greenawalt repeatedly shot the Lyons' and
92
Theresa Tyson, 9 ' killing all the victims. Raymond and Ricky testified
93
that they were surprised by the shooting.
80. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1667, 1692 (Brennan, J., dissenting) reh'g
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201 (1987).

81. Id. at 1678.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1678-79.
85. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1692, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201
(1987). Id.at 1679.
86. Id.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1692, (Brennan, J., dissenting) reh'g

denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201 (1987).

91. Id. There is a discrepancy between Raymond's and Ricky's testimony on
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The Tison group continued their flight in the Lyons' Mazda. 94
Soon thereafter, they purchased paint and painted the Mazda a
different color. 95 The details are sketchy at this point, but after two
vehicle changes, 96 they approached a roadblock in a van at which a
shootout and chase ensued. The van veered off the highway at a
second roadblock after which officers saw some of the occupants run
into the desert. Donald Tison was found at the wheel of the vehicle,

killed by a gunshot wound to the head. Gary Tison was found several
days later in the desert where he had died of exposure. Raymond and
Ricky Tison and Greenawalt were all taken into custody after being
97
found in the desert.

The petitioners, Raymond and Ricky Tison, were charged with
four counts of first degree murder, three counts of kidnapping, two
counts of armed robbery, and one count of theft of a motor vehicle. 9
The petitioners were convicted of the four murders99 under the Arizona
accomplice liability and felony-murder statutes.100

Pursuant to the state's separate capital sentencing proceeding,

the judge had to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances
the facts at this point. Ricky Tison stated that he had already returned with the water
when the shootings occurred. However, he also testified that he and Raymond were
still some distance ("farther than this room") from the Lincoln when the shootings
occurred. Id.
92. Id. at 1679. Theresa Tyson managed to crawl away from the murder site,
but died some distance away in the desert. Id.
93. Id.

94. State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 531, 633 P.2d 335, 340 (1981).
95. Id.

96. The group left the Mazda partially covered by pine branches after obtaining
a pickup truck. They then abandoned the pickup truck and acquired a van. Id. 129
Ariz. at 540, 633 P.2d at 349.
97. Id.

98. State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 530, 633 P.2d 335, 339 (1981).
99. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201 (1987).
They were also convicted on three counts of kidnapping, two counts of armed
robbery, and one count of theft of a motor vehicle. See supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
100. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1679-80. The Arizona accomplice liability statute ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-139 (1956) (repealed 1978) provided "that each participant in
a kidnapping or robbery is legally responsible for the acts of his accomplices." Id.
The Arizona felony-murder statute provided "that a killing occurring during the
perpetration of . . . a kidnapping . . . is capital murder. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §
13-452 (1956) (repealed 1978)." Id.
Both statutes have been recodified. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1105(A)(2),
(B) (Supp. 1986) and §§ 13-301(A)(3), (B)(2) (1978 and Supp. 1986). "Neither change
[has] diminished Ricky or Raymond Tison's legal accountability for the deaths that
occurred." Id. at 1680 n. 1.
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to decide whether the crime was sufficiently aggravated to warrant
the death penalty.' 0
The court found the following aggravating factors in the petitioners' cases: "(1) the Tisons had created a grave risk of death to
others (not the victims); (2) the murders had been committed for
pecuniary gain, (3) the murders were especially heinous."'0 2 The court
found no statutory mitigating factors in this case. 03 However, the
court did find the following nonstatutory mitigating factors present
in the petitioners' cases: "(1) the petitioners' youth-Ricky was 20,
Ray was 19 (2) neither had prior felony records; (3) each had been

101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(A) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978). The
statute set out the following aggravating circumstances for the judge to consider:
1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States
for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was
imposable.
2. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the United States
involving the use or threat of violence on another person.
3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a
grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the victim
of the offense.
4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or
promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value.
5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt or
in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner.
ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978). The statute set out
the following mitigating circumstances to be considered by the judge:
1. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired, but not so impaired so as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
2. The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not
such as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
3. The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another under
the provisions of [§] 13-303, but his participation was relatively minor,
although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
4. The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in
the course of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was
convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to
another person.
102. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1680.
103. The judge held the petitioners' participation in the crime was not minor
and that they could have reasonably foreseen their conduct would create a grave risk
of death to another person. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1680, reh'g denied,
107 S. Ct. 3201 (1987).
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convicted of the murders under the felony-murder rule." The judge
then sentenced Ricky and Raymond Tison to death. 1°4
On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the
aggravating circumstance concerning creation of a grave risk to others
was not present because all those killed were intended victims and no
one else was ever exposed to a grave risk of death. 105 The Arizona
Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court
of Yuma County stating:
The deaths would not have occurred but for [Ricky and
Raymond Tisons'] assistance. That they did not specifically
intend that the Lyonses and Theresa Tyson die, that they did
not plot in advance that these homicides would take place, or
that they did not actually pull the triggers on the guns which
inflicted the fatal wounds is of little significance. °6
The United States Supreme Court denied the Tisons' petition for
certiorari. ,01
Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Enmund, the petitioners collaterally attacked their sentences in the
Arizona Supreme Court alleging that Enmund required reversal of
their cases. 08 The court interpreted Enmund as prohibiting the "imposition of the death penalty absent a showing that the defendant
killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill."' 9 After stating that the
petitioners did not kill nor attempt to kill, the court found that they
intended to kill."10 The finding was based on the following definition
of "intent to kill": "Intent to kill includes the situation in which the
defendant intended, contemplated, or anticipated that lethal force
would or might be used or that life would or might be taken in
accomplishing the underlying felony.""' The court claimed certain
facts evinced a showing that the petitioners "intended to kill,""11 2 such
as:
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 633 P.2d 335 (1981); State v. Tison, 129
Ariz. 546, 633 P.2d 355 (1981).
108. State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 690 P.2d 747 (1984); State v.
(Raymond Curtis) Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 690 P.2d 755 (1984).
109. State v. (Raymond Curtis) Tison, 142 Ariz. at 456, 690 P.2d at 757.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing State v. Emery, 141 Ariz. 549, 554, 688 P.2d 175, 180 (1984)).
112. State v. (Raymond Curtis) Tison, 142 Ariz. at 457, 690 P.2d at 758. See
also, State v. (Ricky Wayne) Tison, 142 Ariz. 447, 690 P.2d at 749 (1984).
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[Pletitioner[s'] participation up to the moment of the firing of
the fatal shots was substantially the same as that of Gary
Tison and Greenawalt. . . . Petitioner[s], actively participated
in the events leading to death by, inter alia, providing the
murder weapons and helping abduct the victims. Also, petitioner[s] [were] present at the murder site, did nothing to
interfere with the murders, and after the murders even continued on the joint venture."'
4
The judgment was affirmed."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the Arizona Supreme Court correctly applied Enmund."5

B.

DECISION AND RATIONALE

In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the United States Supreme
Court held that major participation in the felony committed, coupled
with reckless indifference to human life, is a sufficient culpability
level to warrant the death penalty even though none of the petitioners
killed, attempted to kill, nor intended to kill." 6 The Supreme Court
vacated the judgments below and remanded for a determination of
whether petitioners' mental states were ones of reckless indifference
7
to human life."
Justice O'Connor first analyzed the rationale used in the propor8 explaining that the Court in Enmund
tionality issue of Enmund,"1
looked at legislative and jury behavior to gain insight as to whether
society in general felt the death penalty would be disproportional in
Enmund's situation." 9 Using this analysis as a background, 20 the
Court in Enmund then embarked upon its own proportionality analysis considering the purposes of punishment, Enmund's degree of
2
participation in the killings, and Enmund's culpable mental state.' '
The Court interpreted Enmund to hold: (1) capital punishment is
113.
(1984).
114.
115.
(1987).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
(1987).
121.

State v. (Raymond Curtis) Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 457, 690 P.2d 747, 749
Id.
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1681-82, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Tison
Id.

1688.
1682-84.
1682-83.
v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1683, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

disproportionate to the crime for the "category" of the felonymurderer "who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had
any culpable mental state"; and (2) capital punishment is appropriate
for the "category" of the felony-murderer who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. 122 The Court then distinguished
Enmund from the Tison brothers' case in that the Court's holdings
in Enmund were directed to only two "categories" of felony-murder23
ers, neither of which applied to the Tison brothers.
The Court determined the petitioners fell outside of the Enmund
"category" pertaining to felony-murderers who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill because, unlike the Arizona
Supreme Court's finding, 24 the petitioners did not "intend to kill"
the victims. Justice O'Connor's reasoning was as follows:
[O]ne intends certain consequences when he desires that his
acts cause those consequences or knows that those consequences are substantially certain to result from his acts....
[T]here is no evidence that either Ricky or Raymond Tison
took any act which he desired to, or was substantially certain
would, cause death ....
[We reject the Arizona Supreme
Court's definition of "intent to kill" because it] attempted to
reformulate "intent to kill" as a species of foreseeability [in
that it included in its definition of the term] . . . situation[s]
in which the defendant ... contemplated, or anticipated that
lethal force would or might be used or that life would or
might be taken in accomplishing the underlying felony. 125
The Court determined that the petitioners' situations did not fall
within the other category of felony-murderers dealt with in Enmundthe category pertaining to a felony-murderer who neither intended to
kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state, because
the Tison brothers' degree of participation in the crimes was major
and, further, because the Court believed the record could support a
finding of their culpable mental states being ones of reckless indifference to human life. The Court then pointed to many facts which it
believed to evince the culpable mental state of reckless indifference to
26
human life.
122. Id. at 1684.
123. Id.

124. See supra note 112.

125. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1684, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201
(1987).
126. Id. at 1684-85. Those facts the Court stated are as follows:
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Although the Court in Tison felt that Enmund did not deal with
persons in Ricky and Raymond Tisons' positions or "category," the
Court did find the Court's method of conducting proportionality
1
analysis in Enmund the appropriate one to be applied to the Tisons. "
The Court next proceeded to apply the Enmund method of conducting
proportionality analysis to the facts in the situation at hand.

In its proportionality analysis, the Court first looked at the state
felony-murder statutes and stated that "the greater the defendant's
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with

reckless indifference to human life."1 1 28 This led the Court to the

conclusion that of the thirty-two American jurisdictions authorizing
12 9
only a minority (eleven)
the death penalty for felony-murders,

Id.

Raymond Tison brought an arsenal of lethal weapons into the Arizona
State Prison which he then handed over to two convicted murderers, one of
whom he knew had killed a prison guard in the course of a previous escape
attempt. By his own admission he was prepared to kill in furtherance of the
prison break. He performed the crucial role of flagging down a passing car
occupied by an innocent family whose fate was then entrusted to the known
killer he had previously armed. He robbed these people at their direction
and then guarded the victims at gunpoint while they considered what next
to do. He stood by and watched the killing, making no effort to assist the
victims before, during, or after the shooting. Instead, he chose to assist the
killers in their continuing criminal endeavors, ending in a gun battle with
the police in the final showdown.
Ricky Tison's behavior differs in slight details only. Like Raymond, he
intentionally brought the guns into the prison to arm the murderers. He
could have foreseen that lethal force might be used, particularly since he
knew that his father's previous escape attempt had resulted in murder. He,
too, participated fully in the kidnapping and robbery and watched the killing
after which he chose to aid those whom he had placed in the position to
kill rather than their victims.

127. Id. at 1685. The Court stated: "Like the Enmund Court, we find the state
legislatures' judgment as to proportionality in these circumstances relevant to [the]
...constitutional inquiry [of whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the eighth amendment prohibits the death penalty in this case]." Id. The Court also
looked at jury determinations of specific cases in conducting proportionality analysis,
just as the Court in Enmund had. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 1685.

129. The Court found the following in its statute investigation: four states permit
the death penalty in felony-murder cases upon a showing of a culpable mental state
such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 411501(l)(a) (1977 and Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 636(a)(2), (b) (1987);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(l)(b) (1984); ILL. Rv. STAT. Ch. 38, paragraphs 9l(a)(3), 9-1(b)(6) (1987)); two jurisdictions require the defendant's participation to be
substantial (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(4) (1985); 49 U.S.C. § 1473(c)(6)(D)
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prohibit the death penalty even though the defendant's participation
in the felony-murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so
substantial as to raise an inference of extreme indifference.' 3 0
The Court continued its analysis on proportionality by pointing
to five state cases which upheld the death penalty upon a defendant
whose participation in a felony-murder likely to result in the loss of
human life was major even though the defendant lacked the intent to
kill.'3 The Court noted the "apparent consensus" that society accepts

(1976 ed.)); at least six more states take minor participation in the felony into account
expressly as a mitigating factor (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(3) (1978 and
Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(d) (1978 and Supp. 1987); IND. CODE

§ 35-50-2-9(c)(4) (Supp. 1986);

MONT. CODE ANN.

46-18-304(6) (1987);

NEB.

REV.

§ 29-2523(2)(e) (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(4) (1983)); six additional
states permitted the imposition of the death penalty for felony-murder simpliciter
(CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2(a)(17) (West Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(l)(a),
775.082(1), 921.141(5)(d) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1(a), 17-10-30(b)(2) (1984
and 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law Co-op. 1985 and Supp.
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-202(a), 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2101, 6-2-102(h)(iv) (1988)); three states permit the death penalty after finding an
aggravating factor even in the case where the defendant's mental state fell short of
intent to kill as long as he was a major actor in a felony in which he knew a death
was highly likely to occur (IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g) (Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT., tit.
21 § 701.12 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (1988)); only eleven states
which authorize capital punishment would not permit the imposition of the death
penalty even though the defendant's participation in the felony-murder was major
and the likelihood of killing is so great as to raise an inference of extreme recklessness
(ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-23, 13A-5-40(a)(2), (b), 13A-5-51, 13A-6-2(a)(2) (1982 & Supp.
1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(1) (West Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. §
99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1987); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 200.030(l)(b), 200.030(4), 200.033(4)(a)(b) (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-l(A)(2), 31-20A-5 (1984 & Supp. 1988); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3a(a), (c) (West Supp. 1988) (felony-murder not capital); Omo
REV. CODE ANN. sections 2903.01(B)-(D), 2929.02(A), 2929.04(A)(7) (Anderson 1987);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.095(d), 163.115(1)(b) (1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§
19.02(a), 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)
(Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (1988)). Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1685-86.
130. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1686 n. 10, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct.
3201 (1987). These states are Alaska, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico,
New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Virginia.
131. Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 84, 656 S.W.2d 684, 687 (armed, forced entry,
nighttime robbery of private dwelling known to be occupied plus evidence that killing
contemplated), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581,
599-600 (Del. 1985) (defendant present at scene, robbed victims, conflicting evidence
as to participation in killing), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1589 (1987); Ruffin v. State,
420 S.2d 591, 594 (Fla. 1982) (defendant present, assisted codefendant in kidnapping,
raped victim, made no effort to interfere with codefendant's killing victim and
continued on the joint venture); People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 52, 447 N.E.2d 353,
STAT.

1988:1551

TISON v. ARIZONA

the death penalty as an appropriate punishment under these circum-

stances. 132

Against the backdrop of the state felony-murder statutes and the
five cases alluded to above, the Court conducted its own proportionality analysis as to the conduct of the Tisons.' 33 Using Lockett v.
Ohio'3 4 and Enmund as supporting authority, the Court found that
in determining the proportionality between the punishment and the
crime, it is crucial to determine the individual culpability level and,
hence, the mental state of each petitioner during the commission of

the offense.' 35 According to the Court, determining the individual

culpability level of the defendant was required in its proportionality
analysis because a criminal should be punished more severely as the
purposefulness of his conduct increases. The Court further stated that
in some cases the culpability level of reckless indifference to human
life is sufficiently severe to warrant the death penalty. 3 6 The Court
then explained that the reason the state is allowed to impose the death

penalty for a defendant's reckless disregard for human life under

some circumstances is because "reckless indifference to the value of
human life may be every bit as shocking as 'intent to kill."" 37
378 (defendant present at scene and had participated in other crimes with Holman,
the triggerman, during which Holman had killed under similar circumstances), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983) reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984); Selvage v. State
680 S.W.2d 17, 22 (Tex. Cr. App. 1984) (participant in jewelry store robbery during
the course of which a security guard was killed; no evidence that defendant himself
shot the guard, but he did fire a weapon at those who gave chase). Tison, 107 S. Ct.
at 1686-87.
132. Tison, 107 S.Ct. at 1686.
133. Id.at 1687.
134. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See supra footnote 35.
135. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 1687, reh'g denied, 107 S.Ct. 3201
(1987). Justice O'Connor noted that Lockett and Enmund support this proposition:
[T]he plurality opinion [in Lockett] made clear that the defendant's mental
state was critical to weighing a defendant's culpability under a system of
guided discretion.... In Enmund v. Florida, the Court recognized again
the importance of mental state, explicitly permitting the death penalty in at
least those cases where the felony murderer intended to kill and forbidding
it in the case of a minor actor not shown to have had any culpable mental
state.
Id.at 1687.
136. Id.at 1688.
137. Id.The Court gave two examples as to when this statement would be true:
[T]he person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or
dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly
indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended
consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim's property.
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Finally, the Court found that if a major participant in a felonymurder displayed reckless indifference to human life, he possessed a
highly culpable mental state.'38 One displaying the culpability level of
reckless indifference to human life lies outside the two felony-murderer
"categories" ruled upon in Enmund;3 9 therefore, the Court was
free
to conduct its own proportionality analysis. Pursuant to its own
proportionality analysis the Court held that capital punishment, imposed against one whose participation in the felony committed was
major and who showed a mental state of reckless disregard for human
life, is not an excessive punishment under the eighth amendment.' 40
Since the trial court had found the former to exist,' 41 the case was
remanded for determination of the latter.' 42
C. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The United States Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona considered
the question of whether one, whose participation in the underlying
felony committed was major and who was recklessly indifferent to
human life, had a sufficiently culpable mental state to warrant the
death penalty. 4 The Court conducted a proportionality analysis in
determining whether the death penalty was a constitutional punishment for the Tisons if the trial court upon remand were to find that
the Tisons acted in reckless disregard to human life.' 44
Since Coker was decided in 1977, Supreme Court cases have
consistently utilized proportionality analysis to resolve the issue of
whether a punishment is excessive for a particular defendant. 45 Thus,
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1688, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201
(1987).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1685-88.
145. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (the Supreme Court conducted
proportionality analysis to determine whether the death penalty was excessive punishment for the crime of rape where no life had been taken); see also Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980) (the Supreme Court conducted proportionality analysis to
determine whether life imprisonment was excessive punishment upon a third conviction of a felony less than capital); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (the
Supreme Court conducted proportionality analysis to determine whether the death
penalty was excessive punishment for the driver of a "getaway" car who was not
present at the scene of an armed robbery in which a murder took place); Solem v.

Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (the Supreme Court conducted proportionality analysis to
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modern eighth amendment jurisprudence suggests that proportionality
analysis is an integral part in deciding whether a punishment is cruel

and unusual.
The use of state statutes and jury determinations on a nationwide

scale in conducting proportionality analysis is consistent with Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence.'4 Since Coker and up until Tison, all
Supreme Court cases wherein an Eighth Amendment proportionality
statistics.1 47
analysis was conducted did so by looking to nationwide
determine whether life imprisonment without possibility of parole was excessive
punishment for a seventh nonviolent felony after being convicted of uttering a "no
account" check for $100).
146. See infra note 147.
147. The Court in Coker considered all states in its proportionality inquiry: "At
no time in the last 50 years have a majority of the states authorized death as a
punishment for rape.... Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the
present time that authorizes a sentence of death [for the crime at issue]." Coker, 433
U.S. at 593, 596. The Court in Rummel also considered all states in its proportionality

determination:
Rummel's charts and tables do appear to indicate that he might have received
more lenient treatment in almost any State other than Texas, West Virginia,
or Washington. [However, this fact is not dispositive in this non-capital
It is
case because] [t]he distinctions . . . are subtle rather than gross ....
punishment
capital
impose
that
states
one thing for a court to compare those
It is quite another
for a specific offense with those States that do not ....
of any particular
position
the
evaluate
to
attempt
to
court
a
for
thing
recidivist scheme within Rummel's complex matrix.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 279-80 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Court in Enmund
considered every state in its statute survey: "[O]nly about a third of American
jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant who [is in the same category as Enmund]
to be sentenced to die. . . . [Tihe current legislative judgment . . . weighs on the side
of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue." Enmund, 458 U.S. at 79293. The Court in Enmund also conducted its jury determination survey on a
nationwide scale:
The evidence is overwhelming that American juries have repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as petitioner's. . . . That juries
have rejected the death penalty in cases such as this one . . . is also shown
Of the 739
by petitioner's survey of the Nation's death-row population ....
[death-row inmates] for whom sufficient data are available . . . only 3 [are
in Enmund's category].
Id. at 794-95 (emphasis added). The Court in Solem also looked at all jurisdictions:
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could
have received a life sentence without parole for his offense in only one other
.and we have no reason to doubt this finding. . . . At the
state .......
very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a
severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. . . . It appears that Helm was treated
more severely than he would have been in any other State.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 299-300.
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Such prior use of nationwide data strongly suggests the courts should
presently, and in the future, conduct state statute and jury determi-

nation surveys on a nationwide scale. Moreover, consideration of all

jurisdictions is consistent with the purpose of proportionality analysis
which is to acquire an overall assessment of contemporary societal

values-not an assessment of the contemporary values of a conveniently selected portion of society.' 48 Therefore, recent case law and
policy reasons both suggest that all jurisdictions should be considered
in a court's proportionality analysis.
Prior cases also suggest that proportionality analysis is a generic
analysis-i.e., an analysis applied similarly from case to case whereby

the inputs, not the analysis itself, determine the outcome.

49

For

instance, after finding that only one jurisdiction would authorize the
death penalty for the rape of an adult, the Court in Coker held capital
punishment to be disproportionate. 110 Likewise, after finding that only
two jurisdictions would impose a life sentence without possibility of

parole for a seventh nonviolent felony, the Court in Solem v. Helm,' 5'
held such punishment to be disproportionate.15 2 Yet, in Rummel v.
Estelle, 53 the Court held life imprisonment for a third felony less
than capital to be a proportionate punishment after analyzing recidivist statutes of other states. 5 4 Thus, in similarly applying the same

analytical model to several different cases, the disparate outcomes
were the result of the differing facts of each case.
In short, modern eighth amendment jurisprudence strongly sug-

gests that when analyzing whether a crime should be subject to a
certain penalty, courts should conduct the generic proportionality
analysis encompassing all jurisdictions from case to case in a similarly
applied fashion.
148. The Court in Coker stated: "[In] Eighth Amendment judgments ...
attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence ... "
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. The Court then looked at jury determinations because they
reflected contemporary societal values: .'"[The jury ... is a significant and reliable
objective index of contemporary values . . . ' . . . and . . . it is thus important to
look to the sentencing decisions that juries have made in the course of assessing
whether capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the crime being tried." Id.
at 596 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875
(1976)).
149. See infra notes 150-54.
150. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
151. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See supra notes 145 and 147.
152. Solem, 463 U.S. 277.
153. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See supra notes 145 and 147.
154. Id.
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Even though prior cases indicate that proportionality analysis
should be applied similarly from case to case, there are significant
differences between Tison and prior eighth amendment jurisprudence
as to how the courts conducted proportionality analysis. The Court's
statutory survey in Tison did not include all fifty-one jurisdictions,
55
but rather, included thirty-two American jurisdictions.' Moreover,
the Tison jury determination survey did not look at nationwide deathrow statistics, but rather, consisted wholly of pointing to five cases
in which defendants, who were in purportedly similar situations to
6
that of the Tisons, were sentenced to death.'- The above differences
between Tison and prior cases as to the application of proportionality
analysis highly disturbed Justice Brennan in his dissent:
[Tihe basic flaw in today's decision is the Court's failure to
conduct the sort of proportionality analysis that the Constitution and past cases require....
The Court's objective evidence that the statutes of
....
roughly 20 States appear to authorize the death penalty for
defendants in the Court's new category is therefore an inadequate substitute for a proper proportionality analysis....
I conclude that the proportionality analysis and result in

this case cannot5 7be reconciled with the analyses and results of
previous cases.
Furthermore, the differences between Tison and prior cases as to the
application of proportionality analysis is also disturbing from a policy
155. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1685-86, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201
(1987).
156. Id. at 1686-87.
157. Id. at 1693, 1699, 1701 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note

Justice O'Connor stated that the five cases cited support the proposition that death
is a proportionate punishment when the defendant has substantially participated "in
a violent felony under circumstances likely to result in the loss of innocent human
life even absent an 'intent to kill."' Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686. However, as the
dissent points out, four out of the five cases cited contained no findings as to whether
the defendant was found to have had the culpability level of intent to kill. Id. at
1696-97 n. 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Furthermore, the same four cases contained
suggestions in the court opinions that the defendants either intended to kill, attempted
to kill, or participated in the actual killing." Id. Hence, it is highly likely in four out
of the five cases, the defendants do not fit into the Tison brothers' category. Thus,
it can be said with correctitude in only one case, that a cited case supports the
Court's proposition in Tison that jury determinations indicate sentencing the Tisons
to death is proportional to the crime.
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standpoint. Merely looking at thirty-two conveniently selected jurisdictions and five jury determinations, rather than nationwide statistics,
flies in the face of the very purpose of proportionality analysis which
is to acquire an overall assessment of contemporary societal values.,"
The question remains, therefore, how Tison would have been
decided if nationwide statistics had been used in the Court's proportionality analysis. The Court found during its proportionality analysis
that twenty-one states allowed the imposition of death for the Tisons'
conduct. 59 However, before a finding can be made that a punishment
is proportional to a particular defendant, it seems that a majority of
jurisdictions must allow the punishment's imposition upon the defendant.160 When one looks to nationwide statistics in the Tison case,
one finds that thirty out of fifty-one jurisdictions would not allow
the Tisons to be put to death.16 ' In proffering one reason why he

158. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
159. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686. In actuality, only twenty jurisdictions would
impose death upon the Tisons. The Tison dissent pointed out one jurisdiction included
by the majority as one of the twenty-one jurisdictions which would impose death
upon the Tisons, has interpreted the statute to require a finding of intent to kill
before death can be imposed. Id. at 1696 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. The Court has not expressly stated the requisite number of jurisdictions
which are needed to make a finding on proportionality. Felony Murder Rule, supra
note 38, at 269-70 n. 82. However, the Court has alluded to what the answer may
be. In Gregg, the death penalty was found to be not disproportionate where thirtyfive states allowed its imposition for murder. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 17980 and 187, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1975). Whereas, in Coker, the Court held
capital punishment to be disproportionate for a given offense when only one state
allowed death to be imposed for the offense. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596,
598 (1977). The Court in Woodson went further by holding that fourteen jurisdictions
were not sufficient to validate the mandatory death sentence. Death Penalty, supra
note 38, at 197 n. 103. Past cases, therefore, at the very least, indicate the requisite
number of jurisdictions with similar statutes needed to make a finding on proportionality falls somewhere between fourteen and thirty-five.
Moreover, the language of the cases seem to further pinpoint how many
jurisdictions, allowing a certain punishment for a particular offense, are needed to
make a conclusion as to proportionality. The Supreme Court has indicated that a
majority of jurisdictions allowing a certain punishment for a particular offense is not
an irrelevant amount. During its proportionality analysis, the Court in Coker stated
that "[alt no time in the last [fifty] years have a majority of the states authorized
death for a punishment for [the subject offense]." Coker, 433 U.S. at 593. Also, the
Court in Tison stated "the majority of American jurisdictions clearly authorize
capital punishment" in cases like the Tisons'. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676,
1687, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201 (1987).
161. See Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1685-86. The Court looked at the thirty-two states
which authorized capital punishment for felony-murder and concluded that eleven
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fact that the Court's position
dissented, Justice Brennan pointed to the
1 62

was the minority position nationwide.
In looking at jury determinations, the only data mentioned in
Tison was that juries had imposed the death sentence upon a defendant
in the same category as the Tisons in at least five cases. 6 Comparable
evidence was present in Enmund in that three out of 739 death-row

convicts were in a class similar to Enmund.164 When speaking in the
context of hundreds of people on death-row, it is highly probable

that if the number of those convicted who are in the same category
as a defendant is three in one case, while that of another case is five,
there should be no constitutional difference between the cases based
solely on those statistics. Therefore, just as the Court in Enmund

found the jury determination survey to indicate the disproportionality
of the death penalty in Enmund's case, a comparable survey in Tison
would indicate an analogous disproportionality of the death penalty

in the Tisons' case.

The application of nationwide state statute and jury determination surveys to the Tison facts indicate that the Court would have
found the imposition of the death penalty against the Tisons to be

unconstitutional, contrary to its actual finding. Such discrepancies in
the applications of proportionality analysis between Tison and prior
cases are, therefore, highly significant. The justices who dissented in
in Enmund, cited these discrepancies as
Tison, basically the majority
165
dissent.
the basis for their

would not sentence the Tisons to death: "[O]nly 11 States authorizing capital
punishment forbid imposition of the death penalty even though the defendant's
participation in the felony-murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so
substantial as to raise an inference of extreme recklessness." Id. at 1686. When
adding the eleven states to the nineteen jurisdictions not authorizing the death penalty
for felony-murder, one finds that thirty out of fifty-one jurisdictions would not allow

the Tisons to be put to death. Moreover, it might be that an additional jurisdiction
does not authorize the death penalty in the Tisons' case (see supra note 159), bringing
the total of such jurisdictions to thirty-one.
162. Justice Brennan stated:
[A]pproximately three-fifths of American jurisdictions do not authorize the
death penalty for a nontriggerman absent a finding that he intended to kill.
Thus, contrary to the Court's implication that its view is consonant with
that of "the majority of American jurisdictions,"

itself distinctly the minority position.

...

the Court's view is

Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
163. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686-87.
164. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 795 (1982).

165. The Enmund majority consisted of White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, JJ. Likewise, the Tison dissent consisted of Brennan, Marshall, Black-
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Modern eighth amendment jurisprudence strongly suggests that
when analyzing whether a crime should be subject to a certain penalty,
courts should conduct a proportionality analysis encompassing all
jurisdictions from case to case in a similarly applied fashion. In

ignoring nationwide statistics, the Court in Tison not only circumvented assessing overall societal views, but did not apply the generic

analysis in a fashion similar to prior cases. Had the proportionality
analysis been applied in a fashion consistent with prior cases, it
appears that the Tisons would not now face the possibility of being
sentenced to death.
D.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

Enmund held that the death penalty was constitutional in cases

when the felony-murderer fits into the "category" of one "who
actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.' '1 66 The Tison
decision expands upon the Enmund case by finding a new "category"
in which the death penalty is a constitutionally permissible punishment
for a felony-murderer. As a result of Tison, a finding of "major
participation in the felony committed," coupled with "reckless indifference to human life," is sufficient to warrant capital punishment

for a felony-murderer. 167 Therefore, the Tison case increases the

number of felony-murderers facing the possibility of capital punish68
ment. 1
mun and Stevens, JJ. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Tison
stated:
Because the proportionality inquiry in this case overlooked evidence and
considerations essential to such an inquiry, it is not surprising that the result
appears incongruous. Ricky and Raymond Tison are similarly situated with
Earl Enmund in every respect that mattered to the decision in Enmund.
Like Enmund, the Tisons neither killed nor attempted or intended to
kill
anyone. Like Enmund, the Tisons have been sentenced to death for
the
intentional acts of others which the Tisons did not expect, which were
not
essential to the felony, and over which they had no control. Unlike Enmund,
however, the Tisons will be the first individuals in over 30 years to
be
executed for such behavior.
I conclude that the proportionality analysis and result in this case
cannot be reconciled with the analyses and results of previous cases.
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1700-1701 (Brennan J.,dissenting), reh'g
denied,
107 S.Ct. 3201 (1987).
166. Id. at 1684.
167. Id. at 1688. A finding of intent is not required before the death
penalty
can be imposed upon a felony-murderer.
168. "[Tihe U.S. Supreme Court made it easier Tuesday for states to
execute
criminals who are not killers and who never intended to kill anyone."
Reuben,
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One important impact of the Tison decision is the apparent break
with prior eighth amendment jurisprudence as to the application of
70
proportionality analysis.' 69 The discrepancies discussed above' in the
application of proportionality analysis between Tison and prior cases
may further confuse the states. Chief Justice Burger stated in Lockett:
"The States . . . deserve the clearest guidance that the Court can
provide . . . .17, Furman guided the states as to how to implement
death sentencing schemes in accordance with the Eighth Amendment
by pointing out defects in the administration of the death sentencing
process while the Gregg cases performed proportionality analysis to
see whether imposition of the death penalty in a particular case
coincided with contemporary societal values. The Court in Coker
further guided the states as to the conduction of death penalty analysis
in the future by requiring courts to look at objective criteria during
their proportionality analyses. Enmund showed that nationwide statistics are a crucial aspect of the objective criteria looked at during
72
the conduction of proportionality analysis.' However, Tison indicates
that in proportionality analysis, nationwide statistics need not be
considered. The Court in Tison never delineated when to conduct
proportionality analysis by looking to nationwide data as done in
Enmund versus when to ignore nationwide statistics as done in Tison.
Therefore, it has been left to the states to guess as to which method
of analysis is appropriate for a particular case. The Court in Tison
has breached the Court's duty set out in the above Chief Justice
Burger quotation to guide the states in this area. Although the Court
in Tison evidently believed that fashioning a less comprehensive
proportionality analysis than had been used before remained consonant with the strictures of eighth amendment jurisprudence, its use in
Tison may lead to even less certainty in the basic fit of punishment
to crime.
Justices Expand Death Penalty in Felony-Murders, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 22, 1987, at
1, col. 2. William A. Schafer III, chief counsel for the Criminal Division of the state
of Arizona, who prosecuted the Tison brothers, stated the Court's opinion will lead
to more executions in felony-murder cases. Id. at 25, col. 1.
One commentator has gone so far as to say that Tison may have similar effects
upon efforts to impose the death penalty upon defendants convicted of drug dealing
or espionage because "the death penalty is [no longer] absolutely confined to those

who commit murder . . . ." George C. Smith of the Washington Legal Foundation
made such a statement. Moss, Is Death Penalty For Killers Only?, A.B.A. J., at 54

(Jan. 1, 1987).
169. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 145-65 and accompanying text.
171. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978).
172. See supra notes 10-74 and accompanying text.
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Another important impact of the Tison decision is it flies in the
face of stare decisis. In 1986, the Court held in Cabana v. Bullock 73
a mere finding that a death-sentenced defendant "by legal definition
actually killed' 1 74 does not satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. In its reasoning the Court in Cabana stated: "Enmund ...
imposes a categorical rule: a person who has not in fact killed,
attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal
force be used may not be sentenced to death. 75 Since the Court's
above-quoted interpretation of Enmund is fundamentally central to
the Court's holding, 7 6 it is binding precedent-not mere dicta. As
such, the doctrine of stare decisis dictates the Court's interpretation
of Enmund in Cabana should be followed in future cases. 7 7 However,
Tison disregarded the above-quoted interpretation of Enmund since
defendants who did not kill, attempt to kill, nor intend that a killing
take place nor that lethal force be used, are now faced with the
possibility of being sentenced to death. The doctrine of stare decisis
has been derogated by Tison because it is inconsistent with a prior
ruling (as to the correct interpretation of Enmund) handed down only
one year before Tison was decided.
There is one last possible effect of Tison which must not be
ignored. The eighth and fourteenth amendments require that sentencing procedures should not create "a substantial risk that the [death
penalty will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 7 1
There should be a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the ... cases
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'1 79
Since Tison established that the death penalty is constitutionally

173. 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
174. Id. at 390 (emphasis in original).

175. Id. at 386.

176. Id. at 390.
177.
If the Court were to overrule these precedents, a number of other major
decisions also would have to be reconsidered. As we have stated above, ...
the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of
law. For this reason, [I any departure from the doctrine.., demands special
justification.
Welch v. Department of Highways and Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2956-57 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
178. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at
188); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion) (reversing the death
sentence because the aggravating circumstance relied upon by the jury was not
tailored so as to avoid "arbitrary and capricious infliction of death"). Id. at 421.
179. See supra note 21.
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permissible under the "category" of major participation in the felony

committed, coupled with reckless indifference to human life, courts
in future decisions may find other defendants fall within the purviews
of such a "category" and, thus, impose the punishment of death.

However, the standards under this new "category" of "major participation in the felony committed" and "reckless indifference to human

life" do not lend themselves to a clear interpretation. Resultantly, the
phrases "major participation in the felony committed" and "reckless
indifference to human life" may be applied inconsistently by juries

from one case to another. The Court itself stated that it did not
delineate which particular acts and states of mind warrant the imposition of capital punishment.'8 0 Some have stated the standard is so
open-ended that there are no clear guidelines whatsoever for lower
Therefore, sentencing procedures will probably be more
courts.'

arbitrary and capricious as a result of the Tison decision. Such a

result would be contrary to the Court's eighth amendment rulings in
which condemn arbitrary and capricious
Furman and the Gregg cases,
2
procedures.1
sentencing
IV.

CONCLUSION

Modern eighth amendment jurisprudence strongly suggests that
when analyzing whether a crime should be subject to a certain penalty,
courts should conduct a proportionality analysis encompassing all
jurisdictions from case to case in a similarly applied fashion. In
ignoring nationwide statistics, the Court in Tison not only circumvented assessing overall societal views, but did not apply the generic
analysis in a fashion similar to prior cases. Had the proportionality
analysis been applied in a fashion consistent with prior cases, it
appears that the Tisons would not now be facing the possibility of
being sentenced to death.
There are four repercussions of the Tison decision. First, more
felony-murderers will be subject to the death penalty. Second, the
180. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1688, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3201
(1987) ("We will not attempt to precisely delineate the particular types of conduct
and states of mind warranting imposition of the death penalty here.")
181. The Tisons' attorney, Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, said of the
Court's opinion: "It is the most open-ended standard I have ever heard suggested in
[The Court] has turned on the green light . . . and urged
a death penalty case ....
the traffic to move more quickly . . . [by expanding] the criteria for execution beyond
that which any state ever did." Reuben, at 25, col. 1. The same article earlier stated
"[t]he court's decision . . . left no clear guidelines for lower courts." Id. at 1, col.
2.
182. See supra notes 13-48 and accompanying text.

186
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lower courts are now left to guess at which of the Enmund or Tison
methods of proportionality analysis is the appropriate one in a given
case. Third, the doctrine of stare decisis has been violated for no
apparent justification. Lastly, the open-ended standards, such as
"major participation in the felony committed" and "reckless indifference to human life", may lead to an increase in the arbitrariness
and capriciousness involved in death sentencing-a result which is
inconsistent with the contemporary reading of the eighth amendment's
cruel and unusual punishment clause.
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